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Abstract
Despite the local reference historiography, the 1821 Piedmont insurrection still 
lacks a reading that gives due weight to the historical-constitutional aspect. When 
Carlo Alberto, the “revolutionary” Prince of Carignano, granted the Cádiz Consti-
tution, after the abdication of Vittorio Emanuele I, a crisis began in the secular 
history of the dynasty and the kingdom of Sardinia: for the first time freedoms and 
rights of representation broke the direct pledge of allegiance, tipycal of the absolute 
state, between kings and people. The new political system was not autochthonous 
but looked to that of Spain, among the many possible models. Using the extensive 
available bibliography, I analyzed the national and international influences of that 
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short historical season. Moreover I emphasized the social and geographic origin of 
the leaders of the insurrection (i.e. nobility and bourgeoisie, core and periphery 
of the State) and the consequences of their actions. Even if the insurrection was 
brought down by the convergence of the royalist forces and the Austrian army, its 
legacy weighed on the dynasty. In 1823, during the war between Spain and France, 
Carlo Alberto became the hero of the Trocadero: a reactionary choice that influ-
enced the future of Savoy. Certainly the shadow of the Cádiz Constitution accom-
panied Carlo Alberto until 1848, when he granted the Statuto. The pre-unification 
political season was marked by a more moderate text of the Constitution. Over time, 
the Cádiz Constitution became a symbol of the freedom and the exiles of 1821 went 
to fight in Europe for those peoples who were oppressed by the Holy Alliance.
Keywords
Cádiz Constitution; Carlo Alberto of Savoia; monarchy; revolution; repression.
Resumen
Aunque no falta una historiografía local de referencia, los movimientos en 
Piamonte de 1821 todavía carecen de una lectura que otorgue el peso adecuado al 
aspecto histórico-constitucional. Cuando el revolucionario príncipe de Carignano 
Carlos Alberto, después de la abdicación de Víctor Emmanuel I, concedió la Cons-
titución abrió una crisis en la historia secular de la dinastía y el reino de Cerdeña: las 
libertades y los derechos de representación rompieron por primera vez el pacto de 
fidelidad directa entre el rey y el pueblo característico del Estado absoluto. El nuevo 
sistema político no era autóctono y, entre los muchos modelos posibles, miraba al de 
España. Usando la extensa bibliografía disponible, este artículo se adentra en las 
influencias nacionales e internacionales de ese efímero episodio. Pero no solo eso: 
también hace hincapié en el origen social y geográfico de los protagonistas de la revo-
lución (entre la nobleza y la burguesía, entre el centro y la periferia del Estado) y 
las consecuencias de sus acciones. Si la insurgencia fue derribada por las fuerzas realistas 
convergentes y el ejército austriaco, su legado pesaba sobre la dinastía. En 1823, durante 
la guerra entre España y Francia, Carlos Alberto se convirtió en el héroe del Trocadero: 
una elección reaccionaria que influyó en el futuro del monarca de Saboya. Ciertamente 
la sombra de la constitución de Cádiz acompañó a Carlos Alberto hasta 1848, el año 
de la concesión del Estatuto. La evolución hacia un texto constitucional más moderado 
marcará así la temporada política preunitaria. La constitución de Cádiz se convirtió en 
un símbolo de libertad con el tiempo, y los exiliados de 1821 fueron a luchar en Europa 
por los pueblos oprimidos por la Santa Alianza.
Palabras clave
Constitución de Cádiz; Carlos Alberto de Saboya; monarquía; revolución; 
Represión.
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I. INTRODUCTION1
By turning the spotlight on historical events, anniversaries help the 
scientific community and others to reflect on steps so far taken and to open 
new avenues of research. The bicentenary of the 1820 and 1821 uprisings 
cannot but bear fruit in this sense, inserting the phenomenon into the most 
recent historiographical currents, currents which by now inevitably outline 
transnational, or, more accurately, global, panoramas. In the context of studies 
on European sectarian, insurrectional and constitutional movements in the 
period following the Vienna Congress, Turin, and Piedmont more generally, 
have remained in the background, or at least isolated. This has not neces-
sarily been due to lack of interest, since from the start thousands of pages have 
been written about the insurrection of January to April 1821 in the Savoyard 
States, but rather because the event has for a long time been interpreted as an 
ephemeral epilogue to an autochthonous event, a parenthesis in Sabaudian 
history. Somewhat clearer are the political elements that place the Piedmon-
tese uprising within a more general historical process that involved Spain, 
Portugal, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies as well as, in hindsight, the 
dynamics of the entire European Restoration, as Gonzalo Butrón Prida, 
Vittorio Scotti Douglas and Hans Späth have ably shown2.
1 The research was possible thanks to the project DEFE_RILO_17_01 - Ricerca locale 
2017 quota A of the Department of Historical Studies of the University of Turin. I 
am grateful to Ester De Fort for the support and to Matthew Armistead for transla-
ting the essay.
2 Butrón (2006); Scotti Douglas (2011); Späth (2012).
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The fact that Italian high school and university textbooks have dedicated 
only a few lines to the Piedmontese insurrection of 18213 does not mean that 
historiography, even academic, interested in the history of the Kingdom of 
Sardinia in the nineteenth century has neglected the subject far from it. To 
cite the most significant example, Narciso Nada (1925-2004), for many years 
professor of Risorgimento history at the University of Turin, dedicated much 
of his research to the study of this political period4. As early as 1972, in the 
first issue of Studi Piemontesi (to this day an eclectic reference journal for 
research, not only historical, on the region), Nada began his collaboration 
with the periodical by launching a sort of manifesto of studies of 18215. That 
year was particularly profitable for the scholar: after reconstructing the 
 uprisings6, events that had not been updated since the basic but by then obso-
lete work of Torta7 and the various works published for the centenary of 
19218, he oversaw the publication of the important memoirs of Emanuele Pes 
Di Villamarina, a key figure of that brief constitutional period9. And, to 
summarise the various conferences held in the 1980s and 1990s to pay homage 
to the main protagonists of that era (Guglielmo Moffa di Lisio10, Silvio 
Pellico11, Santorre di Santarosa12), Nada outlined historiographical over-
views13, reaching the climax with the chapter dedicated to 1821 published in 
the Storia d’Italia, edited by Giuseppe Galasso14.
By then, however, there had already appeared the magnum opus on the 
1821 Piedmontese uprising: the meticulous work by Giorgio Marsengo and 
Giuseppe Parlato which, through a painstaking examination of the existing 
bibliography and a systematic scrutiny of the sources conserved in the Turin 
State Archive, brought to light hundreds of records of those involved in the 
revolt. The work marked a turning point in studies on the subject, not only 
for the structured nature of the research, but also for the attempt to delineate 
3 Sabbatucci and Vidotto (2009): 113.
4 Viarengo (2005): 666-678.
5 Nada (1972a): 144-160.
6 Nada (1972b): 167-198.
7 Torta (1908).
8 Lemmi et al. (1923); Passamonti et al. (1926); Rossi and Demagistris (1927).
9 Pes di Villamarina (1972).
10 Nada (1982); Nada (1991): 44-59.
11 Nada (1984a): 23-30.
12 Nada (1984b): 5-12.
13 Nada (1991): 65-73.
14 Nada and Notario (1993):151-161.
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causes and consequences, individual endeavours and common destinies, 
social affiliations and lines of action15.
But in all of this the decisive constitutional question has so far been 
overshadowed by two other, admittedly legitimate, questions: on the one 
hand, the nature of secret societies in Piedmont, their composition and 
connections with the Italian sectarian world, and, on the other, the vacillating 
attitude of the Prince of Carignano, Charles Albert, a personage caught 
between liberal tendencies and absolutist demands. In the first case, the histo-
riographical question has been justified little by little by the need to portray 
the social landscape of the bourgeoisie, and of the liberal nobility of Savoy 
overtaken by the national discourse, as the initial nucleus of the nascent 
(moderate) Risorgimento ruling class16. This thesis has recently been met with 
rather unconvincing criticism17. In the second case, the figure of Charles 
Albert, seen as a forerunner or false friend of the constitutional question, has 
loomed over events, invalidating historical discourse, which has at times been 
reduced to an argument fuelling the myth or counter-myth of the king 
presented by historiographies of different dispositions, from the Sabaudian 
one to the democratic one18.
The Spanish constitution (key element not only at European level19) has 
thus remained an adjunct used from time to time to determine the degree of 
democratic feeling among the Savoy ruling class or the extent of the liberal 
contamination of Charles Albert. This despite the fact that a first important 
attempt at contextualisation, to which this essay will make frequent reference, 
was recently made by the legal historian Gian Savino Pene Vidari (1940-
2020) during a conference held in Rome by the Institute for the History of 
the Italian Risorgimento to mark the bicentenary of the carta gaditana20. The 
aim of this contribution is therefore to shift the focus to the constitutional 
issue, construed as an elaboration, but also as the myth and reality of the 
Kingdom of Sardinia in 1821, to borrow the felicitous expression used by 
15 Marsengo and Parlato (1982-1986).
16 Talamo (2000): 463-468.
17 Lo Faso di Serradifalco (2016).
18 Omodeo (1940); Nada (1980).
19 Castells (1989): 117-132; De Francesco (1998): 273-286; Scotti Douglas (2001): 
257-262; Fernández Sarasola (2002): 359-466; Gil Novales (2011): 97-127; Arnabat 
Mata (2012): 47-64; Rodríguez López-Brea (2013): 561-594; Rodríguez López-Brea 
(2014): 115-138; Carantoña Álvarez (2014): 21-40; Corciulo (2015): 583-592; 
Eastman and Sobrevilla Perea (2015): 1-18; Romano (2015): 7-24.
20 Pene Vidari (2015): 559-582.
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Giorgio Spini in one of his classic studies21. Retracing in this way the events 
and the protagonists’ actions of those months makes it possible to give proper 
emphasis to a history that, while transitory, was a harbinger of a new way of 
understanding freedom22. While in 1848 the constitutional reference model 
was no longer the Iberian one —as Massimo D’Azeglio observed to his 
brother Robert: “Viva la constituzione ma non coula de Spagna [in Piedmon-
tese]”23— the statute bestowed by Charles Albert with the “loyalty of a king 
and affection of a father” on 4 March 1848 was modelled on the Orléan 
charter of 1830 and the Belgian one of 1831. The constitution was seen as the 
attainment of a mature freedom24. The memory of 1821, on the other hand, 
was by then associated with an “exaggerated,” outdated and immature season 
that had brought nothing good - other than an acknowledgement of the need 
to eliminate forever the Ancien régime.
II. PREAMBLE TO THE FACTS. INTERNAL DRIVES, EXTERNAL DRIVES
On 31 December 1820, New Year’s Eve, members of the Piedmont 
Senate, of the Chamber of Accounts, of the Turin city council, and the 
teaching staff of the university were gathered, as they were every year, in 
the Hall of the Swiss Guards of the austere Royal Palace of Turin. They were 
all ready to give the sovereign, Victor Emanuel I, a seasonal greeting with the 
traditional hand-kiss25. But no-one could have imagined the words that 
the president of the highest magistracy of the kingdom, the Senate of Pied-
mont, Count Guglielmo Borgarelli, was about to say to the king. Taking the 
word publicly, he said: “Sire, deign to remember that the ancient laws of 
the state are the guardians of security and of your splendour; do not allow 
indiscreet hands to touch them: novelties can lead to great misfortunes”.
There was a moment of extreme embarrassment. The king listened in 
silence and then moved on26. The “indiscreet hands” were those of the minister 
of the interior, Prospero Balbo, who since taking office in September 1819, 
replacing Borgarelli himself, had never ceased trying to reform one of the 
states best “restored” by the Vienna Congress. Until then his greatest aspira-
21 Spini (1950).
22 Ferrando Badía (1959); Colombo (1998): 131-157; Butrón (2012a): 37-54.
23 D’Azeglio (1988): 38.
24 Colombo (2003).
25 Gentile (2013): 159-160.
26 Dionisotti (1881): 30.
DO AS THE SPANIARDS DO. THE 1821 PIEDMONT INSURRECTION AND THE BIRTH … 29
Historia y Política, 45, enero-junio (2021), pp. 23-51
tion had been to convert the Kingdom of Savoy from an absolute monarchy 
to a “consultative” monarchy, creating a council of state and reforming 
communal and provincial administrations27.
Certainly, none of this should have given rise to thoughts of a constitu-
tion: if anything it was an alignment with a Napoleonic past, similar to what 
was happening in Naples, where many institutions established by Gioacchino 
Murat had been maintained, or in the newly created Kingdom of Lombardy-
Veneto, where the model of consultative monarchy had found the right 
compromise between eighteenth-century Habsburg reformism and the 
administration of the Kingdom of Italy under Bonaparte28. But in the climate 
that prevailed in southern Europe, in the midst of the Spanish, Portuguese 
and Neapolitan insurrections, the court of Turin ended up caught in the Holy 
Alliance’s cross hairs: to the point that any adjustment to the absolute 
monarchy with the creation of a collegial body would have been ill received, 
especially since in Vienna there was a not unfounded suspicion that the 
reform would not be limited to the proposal of the moderate Balbo.
Indeed, for too long a rumour had been circulating that Turin was not 
unsympathetic to a constitutional-representative solution. To be sure, it was 
not in court circles that constitutions were being discussed, but a section of 
the younger generation of nobles and of the Turin intelligentsia —participant 
in the Napoleonic administration— had nurtured a desire to bring about a 
radical change of government, albeit always in deference to the monarchy. 
They were liberals —such as Santorre di Santarosa, Luigi Provana, Luigi 
Ornato, Carlo Emanuele Asinari di San Marzano and Cesare Balbo (the last 
two, respectively sons of the foreign minister and the home affairs minister)— 
and they pleaded the cause for a constitutional king.
The foreign ambassadors to Turin helped to incubate this development 
instead of simply observing, as Charles Albert would remark after the events of 
1821. In fact, their salons were often used as meeting places for a very numerous 
“society”, in which all the liberal-thinking foreigners who travelled to Turin 
became involved29: from the Frenchman Emeric-Joseph Dalberg, who actually 
went as far as presenting a constitution plan to Balbo30, to the representative for 
Bavaria, the Count of Sciboltdors, “known as one of the importers of the liberal 
contagion among the patrician youth of Turin”31; and finally to Eusebio de 
27 Romagnani (1990): 468-495.
28 Soresina (2015): 30-35, 46-51.
29 Fiorini (1900): 3-4.
30 Stern (1895-96): 638-642.
31 Spini (1950): 36.
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Bardají y Azara who, until the government of Madrid closed the embassy at the 
end of 1820 and before reaching the Spanish capital to take the post of interior 
minister in the new government in spring 1821, was a fervent advocate of the 
constitutional model32, so much so that he did not hesitate to proclaim “out 
loud, in the salons of the subalpine capital, that the King of Sardinia needed to 
imitate the example of the two Bourbons before being forced to do so by a 
popular insurrection”33. Direct testimony to the Spanish ambassador’s adher-
ence to the constitution came from Cesare Balbo, son of Prospero: “Bardají […] 
who mixed with us at home, called the uprising [of Riego] a childish game; but 
on the day that it became revolution, he blessed it, which was a scandal; and a 
worse scandal is that he praised the same constitution to our young people”34.
III. BETWEEN MODERATES AND CONSPIRATORS: CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIEWS
In short, a week after the New Year’s Day when Count Borgarelli 
sounded the death knells of the reformism of Prospero Balbo, the minister’s 
son, Cesare, again put pen to paper to write some personal reflections on the 
“current state of Piedmont”. It was then an unquestionable fact that there was 
an “expectation” of a representative constitution in Turin: no “private man”, 
not even “the calmest, most retiring, most alien to public matters doubted it”.
For Cesare Balbo only those in government seemed unwilling to face 
reality. And yet, opinions in favour of a constitution had been clearly expressed 
for six months in many written works, “not really signed, but neither désa-
voués by anyone, spread everywhere with amazing speed, read and approved, 
I don’t mean among friends, two by two, or in secret societies or private 
rooms, but in public places and in the offices and the secretariats of State, in 
the palace of the King”35. It was 9 January 1821. The fact that tension 
in Turin was palpable could be seen clearly a few days later when, following 
the arrest of four university students who had appeared in the theatre dressed 
in Jacobean berets and the colours of the Carbonari, the governor of Turin, 
Ignazio Thaon di Revel, called in the army to break the occupation of the 
university that had taken place in protest. There were many injuries among 
the students.
32 Butrón (2012b): 73-97.
33 Romagnani (1990): 487.
34 Ricotti (1856): 372.
35 Passamonti (1926): 307.
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It matters little that the action of the offenders had been more light-
hearted than political, the “preventive” military intervention ordered by Revel 
without consulting Prospero Balbo, who combined the office of interior 
minister with that of education, was a clear sign of schism in the king’s 
council: between the moderates, like Prospero Balbo, who were calling for 
reform, and the reactionaries, like Revel, who were more realistic than the 
king and who had been determined to quell any public order problem for fear 
of revolution36.
In the light of the facts, on 17 January Cesare Balbo penned further 
considerations. “A faction” had been born and raised in Turin that he did not 
know whether to call “carbonari or something else”. The fact was that the 
secret societies were “widespread in every class and condition of people” in 
order to promote the Spanish constitution, the expulsion of foreigners and the 
unity of Italy. This had already created a dichotomy between a constitutional, 
moderate party and the “faction of the Spanish constitution” with “extreme” 
opinions. His conclusion ended with a question mark: “between a govern-
ment that does not see, a party that does not act, and a faction that sees and 
acts, who will win?”37.
Young Balbo, at that time a lieutenant-colonel in the Monferrato brigade, 
spoke with knowledge of the facts. He had come to know Napoleonic France 
well and he had also known Spain well, becoming fascinated by it during his 
stay in Madrid in 1816-19 as an embassy gentleman alongside his father, who 
was appointed in loco minister of the King of Sardinia38. He undertook 
historical studies, developing research on the Iberian wars against Napoleon, 
which he would publish thirty years later39. He could therefore have identified 
only the Spanish-speaking “faction that sees and acts” as that sect of the 
Sublime Perfect Masters “who were the latest reincarnation of the Jacobin and 
egalitarian Freemasonry of Buonarroti”40.
In Turin in July 1820 the doctor Michele Gastone —a native of Mondovì 
and one of the most active leaders of the democratic conspiracy in northern 
Italy— had issued to the “churches” of the sect spread throughout 
northern Italy an order to work to force the princes to proclaim the democratic 
constitution of Spain already established in Naples41. To put it briefly, “the 
36 Gentile (2016): 103-130.
37 Passamonti (1926): 309.
38 Gentile (2011): 160-161.
39 Balbo (1847).
40 Spini (1950): 39.
41 Spini (1950): 39-40.
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Spanish myth and admiration for the constitution of Cadiz, as a banner of the 
democratic revolution, were therefore having a considerable effect in the 
sectarian and revolutionary circles of Piedmont and northern Italy”42. These 
were extremisms that in Turin could not fail to challenge both those who had 
joined (or, like Charles Albert, sympathised with) the much more moderate 
Society of Federals (which far from Buonarroti’s Communist ideals focused on 
the struggle against despotism, on achieving the independence of Italy and on 
obtaining a constitution), as well as those who expressed various liberal- 
moderate positions, aristocratic and innately legalistic which aspired to a sincere 
collaboration with the monarchy for the introduction of a Charte octroyé43.
Prospero Balbo was well informed about the whole scene. Thus, while 
the foreign minister San Marzano, from the congress of Lubiana, became 
increasingly convinced of the need to contain Piedmontese reformism so as to 
remove the prospect of the Holy Alliance taking the disastrous decision 
to intervene militarily (as it was preparing to do with regard to Naples), the 
minister of the interior, between January and February had gone ahead, 
calculating that he might persuade the sovereign to concede a constitution in 
order to avoid the tragedy of a revolution. This was an individual and preven-
tive initiative which disregarded the anti-constitutional direction of the 
 sovereign and his council. In collaboration with his son, Prospero Balbo 
began to study the English, French, Spanish and Sicilian models. He knew 
that the French constitution was supported only by nobles; that the English 
one (especially in the Sicilian version) had supporters among the moderate 
constitutionalists; that the Spanish one, then the most promoted in Italy 
partly for nationalist and anti-Austrian reasons, was the least suitable for the 
Savoy court due to its “assembly” nature44. His personal preference, therefore, 
was for the Sicilian charter of 1812, which had the twofold advantage of being 
Italian and of having been approved by the English45. But for the moment the 
studies remained locked in a drawer.
IV. CARDS ON THE TABLE: THE FACE OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES
The political situation within the Kingdom of Sardinia had worsened by 
the end of February, when on the 28th, at Pont-de-Beauvoisin, on the 
42 Spini (1950): 40.
43 Ibid.: 38-39; Talamo (2000): 466-468.
44 Pene Vidari (2015): 561.
45 Romagnani (1990): 492.
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Savoy-French border, a carriage belonging to Prince Emanuele Dal Pozzo 
della Cisterna, a subject of Savoy, was stopped by the police. Inside the vehicle, 
in which the wealthy Milanese merchant Francesco Chimelli was travelling, 
were found numerous letters by Dal Pozzo and other exiles (including the 
famous Luigi Angeloni) written to various members of the Piedmontese aris-
tocracy linked to the liberal sectarian world46. The seized correspondence 
contained details of a plan for an insurrection that was to lead to the procla-
mation in Turin of a constitution based on the Spanish model. The letters also 
revealed the possible involvement of the Prince of Carignano, Charles Albert.
Equally compromised were some of the most prominent figures of the 
subalpine army and aristocracy: from the baron Ettore Perrone di San 
Martino, a former Napoleonic officer47, to the marquis Demetrio Turinetti di 
Priero48; from the count and artillery major Giacinto Provana di Collegno 
(affiliated to the Naples Carbonari in 181949) to the colonel of the Queens 
Dragoons, Carlo Emanuele Asinari di San Marzano, son of the foreign 
minister of the Kingdom of Sardinia50, and up to the general and inspector of 
cavalry Alessandro De Rege di Gifflenga51. The news reached Turin on 2 
March, arousing immense concern (and embarrassment) in court and govern-
ment circles. That evening the police detained Perrone, Turinetti and Asinari, 
then entered their homes and took away incriminating papers.
But it was clear that the most wanted man was the Prince of Cisterna, 
member of one of the richest families in Piedmont who had served Napoleon 
and Prince Camillo Borghese. He was acquainted with Benjamin Constant and 
had close contacts with French liberals and the Comité directeur, a close friend 
of Eugenio Bardají (the Spanish embassy was located in Palazzo Cisterna, his 
home, in central Turin)52. He was arrested on the evening of 4 March on the 
Savoy border, and from there taken to the fort of Fenestrelle. Notwithstanding 
these high-ranking arrests, the situation was already beyond control: while 
Prospero Balbo and his son Cesare did everything they could to protect the 
liberals and to persuade them to abstain from causing unrest and thereby 
provoking foreign intervention, the minister San Marzano, formerly a luke-
warm reformer and father of one of the top accused, at the congress of Lubiana 
46 Cavicchioli (2017): 399-411.
47 Marsengo and Parlato (1986): 156-157; Bianchi (2015).
48 Marsengo and Parlato (1986): 259.
49 Ibid.: 175-176; Ratti (1982).
50 Marsengo and Parlato (1982): 26.
51 Ibid.: 170.
52 Romagnani (1990): 529.
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gave his full backing for the Austrian intervention in Naples and urged 
Vittorio Emanuele I not to give in to the demands of the liberals to avoid the 
retaliation of the reactionaries53.
For his part the king, on 5 March, commissioned Alessandro Saluzzo, 
minister of war and former guardian of the Prince of Carignano during the 
years of the empire, to sound out how real was the devotion of Charles Albert 
to the monarchical cause. Charles Albert had already secretly met Giuseppe 
Pecchio, an authoritative Lombard members of the Società dei Federati54. 
Thus came the evening of 6 March, when the aforementioned Carlo di San 
Marzano and Giacinto di Collegno, together with Roberto d’Azeglio55, the 
count Filippo Annibale Santorre Derossi di Santarosa (major in the army 
general staff and director of the secretariat of war and navy56), count Guglielmo 
Moffa di Lisio (captain in the King’s Cavalry57) made their way secretly to 
Palazzo Carignano to meet with Charles Albert.
After the revolution, the prince himself revealed what took place at that 
meeting: “they told me that they belonged to societies that had long worked 
for the independence of Italy; that all the plans were close to being completed; 
that I had always shown great attachment to my country, that I could have no 
other end than glory, and that they hoped that I would stand alongside them 
to obtain from the king a slight concession that would be but the beginning 
of future glory”58. To this day the Prince of Carignano’s response to these 
approaches remains a mystery: Charles Albert claimed to have tried to get the 
conspirators to abandon their revolutionary intentions, while Santarosa 
claimed that, on the contrary, he had obtained the prince’s support for the 
rebellion.
What is certain is that Charles Albert did not report the conspirators, 
but instead merely spoke about them to the war minister, Saluzzo, who, in 
turn, passed on the information to Prospero Balbo and to the minister of 
police, Lodi, who did not lift a finger59. Thus in that conspiratorial atmos-
phere, the first day of Lent, 7 March, arrived. As the historian Omodeo has 
written, the Prince of Carignano, in possession of “the grave secret,” arranged 
for the king to leave Turin and then, exerting influence on the conspirators, 
53 Ibid.: 530-531.
54 Talamo (1977).
55 Nada (1965): 97.
56 Marsengo and Parlato (1982): 172; De Francesco (2017).
57 Marsengo and Parlato (1982): 112-113; Crociani (2015).
58 Fiorini (1900): 11.
59 Romagnani (1990): 534.
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delayed the uprising: he wanted to “place himself in the position of mediator 
and virtual arbitrator between the two parties”60. In fact, having convinced 
the sovereign not to leave for Genoa but to move to the Castle of Moncalieri, 
in the Turinese hills, that evening Charles Albert had another meeting with 
San Marzano and Collegno and declared his unpreparedness to make any 
“pronouncement”. He had heard from Cesare Balbo and General Gifflenga 
that the army was not ready for a war against Austria61.
The two did not take this well: by behaving this way the prince would 
be disgraced in the eyes of Europe62. But Charles Albert, apparently thinking 
he had them under control, went on his way, and on 8 March conferred with 
Saluzzo: the minister could go to Moncalieri to reassure the king because the 
planned insurrection had failed. But the conspirators thought differently. 
They had in the meantime been joined by another member of the nobility: 
Carlo Vittorio Morozzo di Magliano e San Michele, colonel of the cavalry 
troops of Piedmont63. And on the day of the insurrection, the 10th, they 
returned to Charles Albert and asserted that the uprising would go ahead, 
without telling him when it would break out.
V. CENTRE AND PERIPHERY: THE INSURRECTION IN ALESSANDRIA AND 
TURIN
In all this toing and froing, the constitutional question first surfaced at 
court on 9 March, when Prospero Balbo went to Moncalieri and took the 
opportunity to consult with the queen, Maria Teresa of Habsburg-Este. Their 
discussion centred around the Spanish constitution. Shortly before the queen 
had lent Countess Balbo, with a request that she show it to her husband, the 
widely read treatise, Sulla costituzione di Spagna, by the Swiss ultra-reac-
tionary Karl Ludwig von Haller64. It was in fact a recent translation by the 
Turin publisher Pomba65. In his work the jurist lambasted the Gaditan charter, 
and recommended the most rigorous form of absolute monarchy as the model 
of government. Prospero Balbo read the book, but while he shared the author’s 
negative judgment on the Spanish constitution, in general he did not agree 
60 Omodeo (1955): 188.
61 Comandini (1900-01): 1.116.
62 Romagnani (1990): 535-536.
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with its contents. Instead he suggested another writing to the queen: the trea-
tise Vues politiques sur les changemens à faire à la constitution de l’Espagne à la 
fin de la consolider spécialement dans le royame de Deux-Siciles (1820)66, in 
which the author, the French jurist Jean-Denis Lanjuinais67, suggested an 
entire series of modifications to the Spanish charter that would render it more 
like the French Charte octroyée. In this way the gains made by the Neapolitan 
revolution would be saved, and an intervention by the Holy Alliance averted68.
But it was no longer the time for theoretical ruminations. The conspira-
tors were ready to act. Charles Albert managed once more to speak to Santa-
rosa, informing him that he had taken the necessary precautions to safeguard 
the king. Santarosa repeated that the conspiracy was aimed at Austria and 
that Vittorio Emanuele I had nothing to fear. But he could understand the 
prince’s qualms and therefore undertook to give counter-orders to the provin-
cial garrisons at Alessandria, Fossano and Vercelli, which had been put on full 
alert. It was too late. Colonel San Michele, from Fossano, was already ready 
to march on Moncalieri at the head of his regiment. And late in the evening 
of 9 March at Alessandria Lieut-Colonel Guglielmo Ansaldi of the Savoia 
brigade69, Captain Isidoro Palma di Borgofranco of the Genova brigade70, 
Captain Luigi Baroni71 and Lieutenant Angelo Bianco di Saint-Jorioz both of 
the King’s Dragoons72, together with a group of notables including the doctor 
Urbano Rattazzi73, the lawyer Fortunato Luzzi74, and the businessman 
Giovanni Appiani75 made the decision to rise up under the motto “Italy, king 
and constitution”76.
The rebellion was about to be mounted not in the capital, but in the 
main military garrison of the kingdom: in the shadow of the citadel not far 
from the border with the Lombardy-Veneto Kingdom. Charles Albert, along 
with the minister of war and the governor of the capital, had a lot to do, going 
around the barracks to “remind officers and soldiers of their duties to the 
66 Lanjuinais (1820).
67 Durelle-Marc (2009).
68 Romagnani (1990): 536-537.
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king”. But on the same evening, at Alessandria, Lieut-Colonel Ansaldi took 
the keys of the citadel from the captain who held them by arresting the fortress 
commander, and the morning after, 10 March 1821, Captain Palma with the 
insurgent Genoa cavalry regiment stationed in Alexandria called for 
the constitution of Spain. With the tricolour raised, a governing junta was 
immediately formed for the proclamation of the King of Sardinia as king of 
Italy and the adoption of the Gaditan charter77.
The Spanish constitution “thus made its public entrance in Piedmont 
following the military uprising of the Alessandria fortress: for a little less than 
a month [it would be] at the centre of subalpine political life”78. This precipi-
tated events in Turin. During the hours in which the “provisional provincial 
junta of the Government of the Kingdom of Italy” at Alessandria decided to 
suppress the existing civic administration to appoint another composed of 
pro-French moderates who had taken part in the municipal government 
between 1802 and 181479, Prospero Balbo and Charles Albert crossed paths 
in the king’s antechamber in Moncalieri: the prince had just ended his audi-
ence with the king, in which he exhorted him to grant the constitution, not 
of Spain, but rather that of Sicily80.
Given the worsening situation, Vittorio Emanuele I returned to Turin in 
the evening. His council was in a permanent sitting in order to take measures 
about the bad news arriving from the province: not only had Carlo San 
Marzano moved to Vercelli in the hope of raising the local military garrison, 
but Santarosa and Lisio, who left Pinerolo at the head of three hundred caval-
rymen and headed for Alexandria, signed and published in Carmagnola a 
declaration which stated that the Piedmontese army could not abandon its 
king to the influence of Austria. Thus, by rebelling, they were heeding the 
needs of the country, vowing to defend the sovereign and the honour of 
the crown from all enemies. After the governor of Alessandria fled, Santarosa 
entered the city and assumed control of the army and the national guard.
The king’s council was unable to come up with no other solution than to 
address the troops through a manifesto: the Prince of Carignano gave 
“undoubted proof of his constant zeal”; it was wrong to say that Austria had 
asked to occupy fortresses and to demobilise part of the army; independence 
was secure so long as the authorities did not perceive a threat against the 
monarchy; the king’s pardon was guaranteed to those who returned 
77 Comandini (1900-01): 1117; Livraghi (2012): 63-68.
78 Pene Vidari (2015): 564.
79 Livraghi (2012): 66-67.
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immediately to barracks. The manifesto had little effect. On the morning of 
11 March, Captain Vittorio Ferrero81, at the head of eighty soldiers from the 
Royal Light Legion, travelled from Carignano to Turin and stood in front of 
the church of the borough of San Salvario. Having unfurled the Carbonara 
flag of red, light blue and black, he hailed the onlookers with the cry of “Long 
live the king! Long live the constitution!” before then distributing a procla-
mation praising Vittorio Emanuele I, the Prince of Carignano and the consti-
tution of Spain. The Guard and Royal Piedmont regiments were sent 
to confront the revolutionaries. Although Colonel Raimondi, who wanted to 
restore Ferrero to reason, was wounded by a gunshot from a student, no 
serious action was taken. After having spoken in vain for seven hours to ask 
the king for the constitution and a declaration of war against Austria, the 
Ferrero column was allowed to leave undisturbed for Chieri and Asti by 
crossing the bridge of boats on the Po in front of the castle of Valentino.
VI. EVERYTHING EXCEPT THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION: A SOLUTION 
IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND
Apart from this episode, which marked the beginning of the revolution 
in the capital, Sunday 11 March, Prospero Balbo recalled, was the one and 
only day on which the constitution was spoken about in the Palazzo Reale.
I had always thought it very bad to let any type of concession be torn from us 
out of fear, and even worse to allow any constitution to be imposed. And I felt 
this strongly, at least as much as my colleagues did. But seeing violence begin 
in one field, and fear in the other, and also seeing all the possibility of extremes 
ills and above all fearing the Spanish constitution, I thought, among all the 
choices to take the one, albeit improbable, that there was some hope of 
accepting instead another constitution since all were better than that one. If I 
had been forced to choose, I would have been in favour of the Sicilian consti-
tution, which conformed to the English one, but written in Italian and already 
guaranteed by England to Sicily, as in fact the English minister had recently 
spoken about in parliament. For this reason this morning I gave Mangiardi [an 
official in the ministry] that constitution telling him to highlight its key points 
for His Majesty’s benefit82.
81 Marsengo and Parlato (1986): 14.
82 Passamonti (1927): 326.
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It was on the afternoon of 11 March that Prospero Balbo instructed his 
first secretarial officer, Melchiorre Mangiardi, to formulate a Piedmontese 
version of the Sicilian constitution, preparing a draft adaptation of the 
preamble and a draft proclamation to the subjects, in the hope that the provi-
sion would curtail the increasingly insistent demand for the Gaditan charter. 
Even in those hours, Queen Maria Teresa had forcefully opposed the consti-
tution of Spain:
Quant à cette infâme constitution espagnole, je suis d’avis que quand même, 
en la refusant, le Roi serait assassiné dans son fauteuil, moi avec lui et vous tous 
avec nous, je persisterai à dire qu’il ne faut pas l’accorder. Ce n’est pas que 
j’ignore […] que selon les lois d’Espagne la couronne passerait à mes filles, mais 
une couronne qui ne leur appartiendrait pas légitimement, une couronne 
déshonorée ne me tente pour elles83.
Thus not even the clear advantage of overturning the Salic law that 
would have ensured the passage of the crown to King Vittorio Emanuele I’s 
firstborn (Maria Beatrice, wife of Duke Francesco IV of Modena) rather than 
to Charles Albert (who, while of Savoy, belonged to the secondary Carignano 
branch), made the Gaditan constitution more palatable for the queen. The 
single-chamber parliament (expression of popular sovereignty), the limitation 
of sovereign prerogatives, as well as the preference accorded to the charter by 
the secret societies, were elements too revolutionary for the Sardinian 
 sovereigns. As such, the fallback solution was that formulated by Mangiardi 
on Balbo’s orders, the principal articles of which foresaw the institution of a 
two-chamber parliament with legislative power, executive power and power 
of placet and veto for the sovereign over parliamentary legislation, judicial 
autonomy, the promise of a new code, and tolerance of religious minorities84.
Balbo had carried on with the work, but nothing had yet been  deliberated. 
On the evening of 11 March there was yet another private council, that in 
which the queen disparaged the Spanish constitution. According to her, the 
king should never have to “concede” a constitution but, if anything, to “accept 
one”. Balbo was not of the same opinion: the verb “accept” made the person 
of the king subordinate to popular will. In any event, it was in that moment 
of grave indecision that Balbo proposed the concession of a constitution on 
the English model. Vittorio Emanuele I gave his assent, inviting the interior 
minister to produce a draft of the preamble.
83 Zucchi (1927): 478.
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But there was considerable constitutional confusion in the council: only 
the governor Revel knew that the English constitution was “not written, that 
is, not compiled all in a body”. Thus the question of the best solution was once 
again debated. Balbo advanced the proposal of granting the Sicilian charter, 
whereas Vittorio Emanuele I relaunched the idea of the ancient constitution 
of the island of Sardinia, which called for periodic meetings of three “stamenti” 
(on the model of the States General). The council, however, had doubts about 
a solution considered “too gothic”, even though Balbo maintained it could be 
viable if brought up to date, since the constitution “had the great advantage 
of not being either new or foreign or dictated by others, but already known 
and observed by the king in an important part of his states”85. But he could 
not convince his colleagues, and so the council returned to the idea of a 
constitution on the English model, with two amendments relating to the state 
religion, which would remain Catholic, and the succession to the throne, 
which would continue to be based on the Salic law.
It was at that very time, when Vittorio Emanule I was about to sign the 
edict, that the coup de théâtre happened: San Marzano had returned from 
Lubiana and asked for an immediate audience. There was total silence as he 
related what he had heard at the congress of the Holy Alliance: the substance 
was that the powers would not tolerate revolutions or constitutions of any sort 
in Italy, and the Austrians already had dozens of battalions on a war footing. 
This news was enough to prompt the shelving of plans for a constitution since 
the priority was now that of stifling internal rebellions to avert foreign inva-
sion. But that intention was overtaken by events. While on the morning of 12 
March a new proclamation was published by the king placing responsibility 
on the insurgents for any intervention by the Holy Alliance, which would 
never have recognised the constitutional movement, the citadel of Turin 
mutinied. Three canon shots rang out from the fort at one in the afternoon. 
The three hundred soldiers barricaded within had pronounced themselves in 
favour of revolution. Commander Des Geneys, who had opposed them, was 
killed. The Carbonara flag (red, light blue and black), was raised above the 
ramparts.
Charles Albert was sent to parley with the rebels, who shouted in his face 
“war against Austria and Spanish constitution!”. And on his way back, he was 
surrounded by excited crowds shouting “long live the constitution!” The 
cavalry charged the throng, mortally wounding a woman86. The municipal 
council of Turin then decided to ask the king for the Gaditan constitution, 
85 Passamonti (1927): 331.
86 Comandini (1900-1901): 1118.
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“thereby giving the official coverage of an institutional body to a claim that 
hitherto had been expressed only by military rebels to the existing absolutist 
order”87.
It was too much. At midnight Victor Emmanuel I abdicated: in the 
absence of the heir —his brother Charles Felix was en route to Modena— he 
irrevocably renounced the Crown, appointing his “beloved cousin” Charles 
Albert as regent of the states. In those hours, two conspirators belonging to 
the Società dei Federati presented themselves at Palazzo Carignano to ask the 
prince for the proclamation of the constitution of Spain. The outgoing Balbo, 
before taking his leave, dispensed lapidary advice: “Three things I recom-
mend above all: do not accept that constitution; try at all costs to retake the 
citadel of Turin; then that of Alessandria”88.
VII. EPILOGUE: A STILLBORN CONSTITUTION
When it came, 13 March was a chaotic day. With Victor Emmanuel I 
and his family having left under escort for Nice, the Kingdom of Sardinia 
became a powder keg. In Ivrea the magistrate Alerino Palma di Cesnola, the 
principal local exponent of the Società dei Federati, led the revolt that resulted 
in the proclamation of the Gaditan charter, on the same day publishing an 
appeal entitled Friends of the Spanish Constitution!89. Other insurrections 
broke out in Asti, Casale Monferrato and Vercelli. In Turin, the colonel of the 
Aosta brigade came out of the barracks shouting “Spanish Constitution!”.
At that point the twenty-two-year-old Charles Albert had no choice left. 
After having played for time with a proclamation calling for public peace and 
order, and now under siege from the crowd and under pressure from the 
Turin council, he agreed to promulgate the Spanish constitution. On 
the evening of that fateful day he sent out another manifesto in which, submit-
ting to the will of the new sovereign, Charles Felix, to whom the throne was 
devolved, and waiting to learn of his intentions as to any change of the funda-
mental laws of the kingdom, he acted as interpreter of the people who had 
loudly declared their preference for “a Constitution in keeping with the one 
in force in Spain”.
In essence, the Gaditan charter would be promulgated and observed as 
the law of the state only after those “modifications, which the national 
87 Pene Vidari (2015): 566.
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Representation, as one with Your Majesty, [would] deliberate”90. Enthusiasm 
was sky high. In Turin 20,000 copies of the Spanish constitution translated 
into Italian and accepted by Charles Albert were quickly distributed91. On the 
14th after appointing new ministers and, in the temporary absence of a parlia-
ment, a provisional junta to represent the people, on 15 March 1821, at 8pm, 
Charles Albert swore loyalty to the constitution of Spain:
Io Carlo Alberto di Savoia, reggente del regno, investito d’ogni autorità al 
momento dell’abdicazione di Sua Maestà il Re Vittorio Emanuele, giusta la 
dichiarazione nostra dei tredici del corrente mese giuro a Dio, e sopra i Sacro-
santi Evangeli di osservare la Costituzione Politica Spagnuola sotto le due 
seguenti modificazioni essenziali, ed inerenti alla condizione di questo regno, 
analoghe al voto generale della nazione, ed accettate fin d’ora dalla Giunta 
Provvisoria cioè: Primo. Che l’ordine della successione al Trono rimarrà quel 
egli si trova stabilito dalle antiche Leggi, e consuetudini di questo Regno, e dai 
pubblici trattati. Secondo. Che osserverò, e farò osservare la Religione Catto-
lica, Apostolica, Romana, che è quella dello Stato, non escludendo però quell’e-
sercizio di altri culti che fu permesso in sino ad ora; e di più sotto quelle altre 
modificazioni, che verranno dal Parlamento Nazionale d’accordo con Sua 
Maestà il Re ulteriormente determinate. Giuro altresì di essere fedele al Re 
Carlo Felice, così Iddio mi aiuti92.
The constitution of Spain thus became a reality in the Savoy monarchy, 
with only two changes harking back to tradition as well as others to be deter-
mined by the king and the parliament in the future. Thus on 16 march the 
royal printers officially published the text, including the variations. Charles 
Felix, still in Modena, was informed of the grave decision taken by the regent 
in a letter delivered by the squire Sylvain Costa de Beauregard. Disgusted, he 
tore up the letter and threw it in the messenger’s face. He immediately dictated 
a manifesto for publication in the states of the kingdom, giving notice that he 
had first to verify the abdication of his brother and that he was far from 
allowing any change in the form of the pre-existing government, and that he 
declared “null and void any act of sovereign competence” not signed by 
Vittorio Emanuele I or himself93. For Charles Albert he had only a verbal 
message, given to Costa de Beauregard: “dites-lui que s’il lui reste dans les 
90 Zucchi (1927): 489.
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veines une goutte de notre sang royal, il doit partir pour Novare et y attendre 
mes ordres”94. The Spanish constitution was dead even before it was born.
The regent tried to gain time by issuing another proclamation on the 
18th, in which he stated that he was working to “enlighten His Majesty […] 
about the desires of his people”, given that “His Majesty [was not] fully 
informed of the situation of things in his Royal Domains: a natural thing in 
his absence”95. To no avail. Charles Felix had already written to General 
Bubna, governor of Lombardy-Veneto, requesting him to mobilise the 
Austrian troops on the border of the Ticino river, and to the loyal governor of 
Novara, General Vittorio Amedeo Sallier de La Tour, whom he asked to keep 
the troops in his fortified city under control, so that all the militias that 
remained loyal to the absolute monarchy could converge on the city.
There was no more room for manoeuvre. So, after having appointed the 
recognised leader of the insurrectional movement, Santorre di Santarosa, 
minister of war, on the evening of 21 March Charles Albert left the capital as 
Charles Felix had commanded. He had wanted to place himself at the head 
of the loyalist troops in order to regain the trust of the king, to act as an inter-
mediary between the monarchy and the rebels, and to appear as the saviour 
of the country in the face of Austrian prevarication. But he was not given this 
chance: instead he had to give up the regency, and on 29 March Charles Felix 
ordered him to leave the kingdom and travel to the court of his father-in-law, 
Ferdinand III of Habsburg-Lorraine, in Florence. Thereafter, in the power 
vacuum, the provisional junta under the presidency of Canon Marentini and 
the government headed by Santarosa remained the revolution’s sole authori-
ties. They kept the Gaditan constitution as an emblem, despite not being able 
to act according to the principles it embodied. The charter, moreover, had 
been applauded on 22 March in Genoa, when the city rebelled by forming a 
municipal constitutional council.
But it was now the endgame. Determined to fight to the end, on 7 April 
the few remaining rebel ranks arrived under the walls of Novara. The next 
day the loyalist troops began to bombard the constitutionalists, while the 
Austrians, having crossed the Ticino, began to pursue them. In disarray, 
the rebels took the road to Liguria. Santarosa, before fleeing, prepared a large 
number of passports, and the governor of Genoa, Des Geneys, fearing the 
gathering of the revolutionaries but the arrival of the Austrians even more, 
withdrew enough money from the finance management’s cash desk to hire 
nineteen ships, allowing hundreds of the fugitives to embark and set sail for 
94 Costa de Baeauregard (1880): 132.
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Marseille. Having arrived in that port, the wealthiest made their way to Paris, 
while the poorer majority asked to continue to Barcelona in the hope of 
enlisting in the Spanish constitutional army96.
Many would re-encounter Charles Albert on the battlefields of 1823, but 
the prince would no longer be on their side. Having left together with the 
Hundred Thousand Sons of Saint Louis commanded by the Duke of 
Angoulême, Charles Albert became the hero of the assault on the Trocadero 
and thus reacquired political respectability in the eyes of the European 
powers. Once the torchbearer of the constitutionalists, the Prince of Carig-
nano ended up being the champion of the Restoration. This volte-face inspired 
the poet and patriot Giovanni Berchet to write the romantic poem Clarina: 
“Esecrato, o Carignano, va il tuo nome in ogni gente! Non v’è clima sì lontano 
ove il tedio, lo squallor, la bestemmia d’un fuggente non ti annunzi tradi-
tor”97. The prince, and later king (from 1831), would go on to write four 
memorials to dispel the counter-myth attached to him98.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Despite the fact that the Piedmont revolution of 1821 lasted only about a 
month, it rightly takes its place as a fundamental chapter of the nineteenth-cen-
tury history of the Kingdom of Sardinia, and, in a broader perspective, of the 
history of the Risorgimento. The event already has an important historiographic 
tradition behind it, albeit one that has yet to answer many questions. If nothing 
else, it has been crystallised in the collective imaginary in different, not to say 
opposite ways: on the one hand as a coup d’état carried out hastily and inex-
pertly, and on the other hand as the first tangible result of the world of secret 
societies ramified throughout Europe, the first uprising that would eventually 
upset the balance of the Holy Alliance. There remains the fact of the over 3,800 
people involved; but, as Giuseppe Parlato has observed, it is still difficult today 
to “establish what the real character of the insurrection was”. There are 
those who denigrated the uprisings, “belittling them as an impossible dream of 
winning power by some young and somewhat spoiled nobles,” and those 
that who have fit them into the framework of oleography “representing these 
uprisings as the first certain and conscious sign of the next, unstoppable national 
revival”. The conclusion —Parlato continues— is that both these positions have 
96 Nada (1993): 156-160.
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over time given the uprisings a local dimension, turning them “into a phenom-
enon of exclusive or preponderant Piedmontese interest”99.
Of course, there is a local element, if only because of the different nature 
of the uprisings that broke out in the provinces or in the capital: from Ales-
sandria, where the touch-paper was lit, a garrison border city that had entered 
the Savoy orbit only at the beginning of the eighteenth century and was char-
acterised by the presence, besides the military, of a very strong proper-
ty-owning, intellectual bourgeoisie intent on obtaining more political power 
for itself within the state100; to Genoa, where the uprising had a strong 
 municipal downturn, partly because of the city’s poorly digested annexation 
to the Kingdom of Sardinia101; to Turin, where, while asking for a constitu-
tion, the officials did not question their loyalty to the monarchy, and where a 
young generation of nobles grown up under the Napoleonic administration 
railed against the harsh restoration carried out by the Savoys.
The constitution had then become a banner beneath which opposing 
factions stood: from the moderates, oriented towards a French or English 
solution, to the democrats, determined advocates of the Spanish one. But the 
Piedmontese uprising as a whole demonstrates how deep-seated, bitter and 
irresolvable was the constitutional confrontation. On one side was the king’s 
council, where many had no knowledge of the various constitutions (apart 
from the Gaditan charter, considered an absolute evil), and on the other the 
revolutionary sects, for which the Spanish constitution, little understood 
despite the publicity effort of ambassador Bardají, and which, following the 
shock wave of the events in Spain and Naples in particular, was reduced to 
more of a slogan than a genuine creed. As Pene Vidari has noted, the trans-
planting of the Constitution of Cadiz - in its Neapolitan variant with the few 
modifications added by Carlo Alberto - into the Savoy system of the period 
proved impossible for three different reasons:
Firstly, it set its mythicised concept of a romantic-national “break” at not only the 
local or Italian but also continental level against the legitimist system of govern-
ment of post-Napoleonic Europe, to which the Savoy government was aligned. 
Secondly, therefore, the harsh reaction of the “concert” of the great powers of the 
time developed, in which the intransigence of Austria and Russia in Lubiana 
gained them the green light not only of Prussia but also of France and England. 
Thirdly, there was the objection of the principal branch of the House of Savoy 
99 Marsengo and Parlato: *207.
100 Livraghi (2012): 63-73.
101 Gentile (2015): 313-330.
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against a constitutional regime, especially a Gaditan one, towards which the main 
political and military force of the Piedmontese Masonic, Carbonari and sectarian 
contingent had directed its constitutional demands, overriding the efforts of some 
young members of the Piedmontese nobility - and initially Santorre di Santa Rosa 
himself - to obtain a different constitutional solution, generally based on the 
English one and mostly mediated through the Sicilian one102.
The Piedmontese uprisings of 1821 were therefore a failure, which 
resulted in the unleashing of exacerbated absolutist politics and police activity. 
It was, however, also a european turning point, the demonstration —together 
with the revolts in Spain, Portugal and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies— 
that the restored governments could no longer survive without Austria’s inter-
vention. And there was more. The insurrections, even if the masses steered 
clear of taking part, did not give rise to the creation of royalist movements; 
that being so, absolute governments could no longer hope for the fanatical 
support of the populace, as they had done in 1799. Finally, while the 
gunpowder had been supplied by the military, there had then been broad 
support by the middle classes: “who had thus offered indisputable evidence of 
their aversion to the restored governments”103.
The Piedmontese authority would have done everything, at the time of the 
judgment, to understate the participation of the bourgeois classes, thus avoiding 
giving political and ideological publicity to the insurrection. The objective was to 
promote the idea of an all-military mutiny, like the revolt that had broken out in 
Spain the previous year, in order to make the European powers, and in particular 
Austria, believe that it had been merely a gesture by a few exalted young people, 
without no real outcome, who, for glory and prestige, had played at sparking off 
a revolution104. However, the reality of the facts would have given the lie to this 
pretence: the exile of those involved (consciously favoured by the authorities, due 
to the many noble families compromised by the generational clash between 
fathers and children) accelerated the process of the Risorgimento. Many would go 
on to take part in the insurrections of Spain, Portugal, Belgium and Greece, not 
a few meeting their deaths (to name but one: Santarosa at the Battle of Sphac-
teria105), fuelling the solidarity of the nationalist movements106.
102 Pene Vidari (2015): 580-581.
103 Nada (1993): 160.
104 Marsengo and Parlato (1982): 48-57.
105 Ambroggio (2007).
106 Bistarelli (2011); Isabella (2011); Brice and Aprile (2013); Diaz et al. (2015); Pulvi-
renti (2017); De Fort (2015): 65-81.
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